Author Topic: World War II and the Art of War  (Read 1188 times)

Offline General_Henry

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World War II and the Art of War
« on: 26-03-2012, 12:03:24 »
I suppose many of the FHers here have read about the Art of War, the one wrote by Sun Tzu.

(edit: busy these days, will update later in the week)

If you haven't heard of the Art of War or know nothing about it, it is a book, probably written over 2000 years ago, somewhere in Ancient China. It do not talk about how to slay your enemy on the battlefield or how to cut a bastard into pieces, it talks about how to win a war in the strategic level.

History Channel has a pretty much dumb-down version: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5jLYgc4nBs

I will skip here the biography of Sun Tzu as "who he is" is still a controversy.

People who have read it might think those are the "common sense" of a warrior/leader, I agree with that to a certain extend, but Sun Tzu is one of the few people who theorize strategies and write about it, and most importantly, his work survived.

Out of total boredom of my mind, and my admiration of the work, also my bit of interest in WWII, I decided to spend a little bit of time to find where this ancient work fit into WWII. And hope to start a discussion to kill more brain cells. If you think you could add more to Sun Tzu, do so and let's discuss!

Let us start by discussing the first chapter:

Chapter 1 - Laying Plans

Source: http://ctext.org/art-of-war/laying-plans      

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English translation: Lionel Giles

"Sunzi said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected."

I suppose this is, now in the modern world, a common sense. Fighting solely for glory, for revenge, for bloodthirsty reasons, or hoping for of miraculous victory, are very much risking to screw your country up.

Arguably, I would suggest that Japan is the country that violated this principle, their goals are way too grand and too luck based for their power.

Almost all nations who start the war are devastated in WWII, put apart lost of lives, Germany lost a chunk of land and entire country in rubble, Japan become a nuclear testing ground and lost all their hard-fought imperial possessions. (What happened to Italy btw?)

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The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

(1) The Moral Law - We see widespread use of propaganda in WWII. The side who lost support of people indeed fall apart: The most obvious example is that Italy is kicked out of war by her own people.

(2) Heaven - this is not about god, as stated above, weather is a decisive factor in WWII especially "general winter"... Germany paid dearly for not paying enough attention.

(3) Earth - It is a bit similar to (2), the muddy grounds of Russia (screwing panzers up), the mountainous area of China (essentially stalled the Japanese). Not giving enough consideration results in epic fail.

(4) Commander - I think this is rather obvious, the side with better commanders have the advantage, look at what Hitler do to his generals.

(5) Methods and discipline - it talks about supply routes and command structure, while I have no knowledge about command structures, supply is one of the reasons Germany failed, the lack of protection of merchant shipping of Japan also lead to her crushing defeat.

(btw, I thought Japan is an Asian country and would read about Sun Tzu, but apparently they act totally opposing to Sun Tzu in WWII)

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Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise: (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat - let such a one be dismissed!

When we analyze the 1941 East Front: (1) No idea, but seemed Germans has a higher support as Stalin is not a good leader in the eyes of quite some number Soviet citizens, (2) Soviet leaders are purged (3) Certainly Soviets have this advantage (4) No comment (5) Not sure how would I interpret this, the Soviets have pretty darn good equipments and quite a lot of them, but to say Germans have inferior power I won't agree. (6) Looks like Germans have better training (7) No idea

Later in the war, (1) is losing for the German side, (2) is remedied by Soviet Generals learning more, (3) is still in the Soviet side, (4) I'd say roughly equal (5) The Germans start to produce stuffs like panthers but the Soviets offset it by numbers (6) No idea (7) No idea.

So it looks like Sun Tzu's theory is correct at least partially here, these factors are certainly something.

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While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.

The interpretation I accept is: it is crucial to gain initiative, the side losing the initiative need to devise a plan to try to gain it. This is common sense now but maybe not for some ancient people.

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All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

We see very clearly that deception is the common thing in WWII, one example is the Germans believe the Allies would not land in Normandy. Surprise attacks are always devastating. Against a foe of similar strength, brute force attack would not be a good idea. Military Intelligence is so important so yes, I think most would agree that this is very important in warfare.

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Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

I don't think WWII generals/leaders do no calculation and send their force into battle/starting a war, even the crazy Japanese know the Americans is capable of outproducing them. This is quite obvious in modern times.

So here ends my comment on chapter 1. In my own interpretation, technology is not necessary as a separate category but a sub-element of the principles above (but I believe it relates to power, the quantity/quality thing), which I find quite amazing.



Chapter 2 - Waging War

Source: http://ctext.org/art-of-war/waging-war

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Sunzi said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

This is nothing but saying that war is very expensive. World War II is indeed very expensive.

note: "li" refers to a distance unit in ancient China, I do not know how to convert, maybe just consider it as a mile or a kilometer.

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When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

You see clearly that Sun Tzu is against any kind of war of attrition. A third party might come along and take advantage of the war-weakened you.

In WWII, world is split into two alliances, so there is no "3rd party" to take advantage of you. Arguably, you could say the colonies benefited because the colonial powers are weakened, however, this is not of their own decision (Germany/Japan started the war). Nevertheless, this is a wisdom.

Sun Tzu would call it crazy when he know that US actually ended the great depression by being dragged into the war.

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It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. The skillful soldier* does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.

*"the skillful soldier do not raise a second levy" should be "the skillful leader..." in my interpretation, this guy likely translated it wrong.

This mainly is about logistics, in a very qualitative manner, Sun Tzu is such an evil guy that encourage the exploitation of your conquest. But think in a different way, Sun Tzu encourage the capture of enemy equipments and provisions here and it can only be wise to do so. He also encourage to bring the fight to the enemy in order to prevent messing your own country up. Indeed, the only country that wasn't messed up is USA.

The scorch earth strategy used by Germans and Soviets is to prevent other side to gain advantage by following Sun Tzu's advice.

The last thing here is to encourage the well-treatment of conquered people/surrendered soldiers if you want to exploit your enemies the most. The idea is that using conquered soldiers to fight is better than using your own citizens so your country exhaust slower by the war. The Germans made the mistake of hating their conquered people (but it is Hitler the evil, so erm...)

You start to see that Sun Tzu is a calm man over there. He want the country to win a war, not to make his country to merely "feel good". Pride and other "personal things" are something to be avoided at all cost if you don't want to turn your victory into a crushing defeat.

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In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

This is more like to criticize people who bring their country into a prolonged war. Most leaders know this except Japan, whose plan is to "exhaust" the Americans by military victories if they don't shock the Americans to peace, no wonder they epic failed - that should never ever be a part of the plan to victory.

It is not to say you shouldn't prepare for an accidental lengthened period of war, not preparing for winter is a pure stupidity rather than following the Art of War.

edit: 2nd chapter included.
« Last Edit: 30-03-2012, 12:03:16 by General_Henry »

Offline General_Henry

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #1 on: 26-03-2012, 13:03:29 »
Chapter 3: Attack by Stratagem

Source: http://ctext.org/art-of-war/attack-by-stratagem


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Sunzi said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

This is general obvious. You don't fight a war for trigger happiness, not for the excitement of blowing stuffs up, not for making your feel superior, you fight for profit, nothing else, else you will eventually fail.

Nevertheless a wise obvious. Fortunately Hitler don't feel this obvious when he ordered to bomb the entire Stalingrad to pieces. Maybe it is hard to conduct a war in such a cold, scientific manner.


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Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

In modern days, this is another very obvious thing: kill your enemies on their way to the frontlines, not directly on the battlefield.

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Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

The first part is more to criticize what people done in WWI. But it also kind of describes the victories Germany had in 1940 - swift advance without much mass destruction.

one concern you might raise, if destruction of enemy cities (strategic bombing campaigns) are essential to crush enemy morale and production, how should it fit with Sun Tzu? Maybe he refers to the cities that you will occupy and exploit as a result of victory.

The latter part predicts the fate of Finland in the Winter War (lacking in numbers), despite putting up a very good fight, they are too small to win, but it wasn't of their choosing, anyway, and they made the wise decision to peace with the Soviets in 1944.

We can discuss whether any successful generals actually perform in the manner Sun Tzu describes, I am sure there are someone to surround with 10 times the number, attack with 5 times the strength. But do any generals actually split their force into two when they outnumber others?

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Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army: (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

It was said that many German generals were performing very well in early war when Hitler allow them more freedom. Epic fails like Dunkirk were the result of leadership interference.

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Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

We see in this, that military intelligence, again, is what Sun Tzu treated with the highest regard. You cannot fail when you know both yourself and your enemy. The reason is because you will not try to fight a battle that you cannot get any benefit, therefore avoiding defeat; You will not give up your strengths or let the enemies make use of his strengths, thus making your always superior to your enemy.

Sun Tzu's philosophy requires a very flexible force, "no retreat order" thing is something he would definitely oppose if there was a better alternative. What if Germany did not hold ground like they did in 1944 and fall back?


Chapter 4 - Tactical Dispositions

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Sunzi said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" To lift an autumn hair* is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

This is more like: "play safe". I do not know people who could put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat other than the USA. Maybe Monty act like this in the desert against Rommel, playing safe.

I don't think this is really realistic in WWII, as this is more like : "camp it out till we become stronger, and then crush you like crushing eggs." It is highly situational. But indeed, attacking in the wrong moment could cost a lot of lives...

*autumn hair means very tiny hair, thus easy to lift. Animals replace their hair in autumn for some reasons (Not a biologist here)
« Last Edit: 26-03-2012, 17:03:42 by General_Henry »

Offline DLFReporter

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #2 on: 26-03-2012, 13:03:39 »
..(What happened to Italy btw?)

They winner-team-joined. ^^

But back on topic:
They lost all their colonies and suffered wast destruction from two armies marching through their country.
« Last Edit: 26-03-2012, 13:03:45 by DLFReporter »
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Offline General_Henry

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #3 on: 26-03-2012, 13:03:28 »
Chapter 5 - Energy

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Sunzi said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

This chapter covers two things, indirect attack, and momentum.

Sun Tzu apparently hate direct attacks against a tough position. Not much crushing victory in WWII were direct confrontation. The blitzkrieg to me is a rather indirect approach - the Germans did not duke it out with the Russians like they did in WWI but instead try to flank and encircle the Soviets. The Soviets did not try to land their massive horde in Stalingrad to take land back a bit by a bit but to attack the flanks and eat the Germans alive. Rommel failed epic when he have to break through the defenses in El Alamein frontally.

Momentum is self-explainatory, the Germans at the end of Barbarossa ran out of momentum and cannot achieve the further strategic goals and got counter-attacked. Maybe operation barbarossa is really too ambitious. Had they realize they are out of momentum and dug in, they might not fail around Moscow.


Chapter 6 - Weak Point and Strong Points

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Sunzi said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
 
By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
 
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
 
Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li! Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yue exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics - that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
It also talks about how to manipulate enemy force concentration for your advantage. Divert foe with a feint, and strike hard in certain (weak) point to ruin your enemies.

I find this chapter very similar to that of Chapter 5, it basically stress the importance of mobile warfare and not to “duke it out” brute force, and that was certainly the lessons people learn from early WWII. The Kursk Campaign, to my knowledge, was anticipated by the Soviets and they made tremendous amount of preparation in await for the Germans, so in my opinion the pincer movement become a disadvantage instead of an advantage for the Germans as it makes them very predictable (at Kursk). To my knowledge, every time the Germans are being successful with “blitzkrieg” involve surprise, Poland, France, and Barbarossa.

Maybe the Germans were true fighters that wants to crush the Soviets brute force instead of using inglorious fooling methods.
« Last Edit: 27-03-2012, 12:03:58 by General_Henry »

Offline General_Henry

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #4 on: 26-03-2012, 15:03:56 »
Chapter 7 - Maneuver

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Sunzi said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. If you march fifty li in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country - its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.

In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.

The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.


A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy - this is the art of retaining self-possession. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished - this is the art of husbanding one's strength.
 
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array - this is the art of studying circumstances. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard. Such is the art of warfare.

The first part talks about the art of maneuvering. The people in WWII surely know of that, they do not march an army from Berlin all the way to Paris – they get on a train, truck, whatever to arrive in the frontline and attack. The following is about “read the map” so you don’t get stuck by natural obstacles. And maps are commonplace in WWII except when Rommel’s tanks running into quicksand. But whether he could avoid it is kind of a question because I heard he read a faulty map.
The following part is about communications, it tells that words cannot spread far effectively and therefore drums were used as signal in the ancient times. The WWII analog should be wireless communications. Flags were still used in WWII for force identification (Soviet flag charge?).

Next is about to strike a tired foe. This sounded a very good idea on paper, of course if you could afford to sleep more you get an advantage, but maybe this is why the Japanese launch their banzai attacks at night – as cover as well as to strike the Americans when they want to sleep. Not to say banzai attacks were successful, though. So I cannot reach any conclusion about the importance of this in WWII.
Last part is to tell “what foe to avoid fighting”. “Do no press the foe too hard” might be worth a discussion: Would pushing into Dunkirk means pressing too hard? Was pushing into Bastogne means pressing too hard (“nuts!”)? Cornering the Germans in Stalingrad certainly worked. A lot of Germans died trying to escape from Falaise, so do this mean leaving a not-too-loose opening a good idea?


Chapter 8 - Variation in Tactics

Quote
Sunzi said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.

Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

I find it a bit hard to understand the 9 tactics. But certainly one lesson would be useful for the Germans: do not linger in dangerously isolated position - Stalingrad. But that is more of a debate as the Germans seemed to want to sacrifice the 6th army in order to allow a full retreat for other forces. The tactic "in desperate situation you must fight" seemed to be working along with the previously mentioned tactic. Though, in modern world, surrender is an option...

Now we may discuss, "commands from sovereign that must be not obeyed". In WWII, if a general does not obey order, it seemed that he will suffer severe consequence. But are there cases where a general disobey an order and bring his troops to victory/out of troubles?

"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him" seemed to be the Chinese variation of "If you want peace, prepare for war". Chamberlain could surely learn from this.

Now, the 5 bad characteristics of a general. Do anyone find them fitting to the horrible generals of WWII?
« Last Edit: 01-04-2012, 12:04:19 by General_Henry »

Offline General_Henry

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #5 on: 26-03-2012, 15:03:09 »
Chapter 9 and 10 to be.

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #6 on: 26-03-2012, 15:03:16 »
last: chapter 11-13 to be.

(sorry for the multipost :P)

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #7 on: 26-03-2012, 16:03:10 »
I would be careful when attributing to specific things in hindsight.
Making Sun Tzu into a prophet isn't that helpful. ;)
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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #8 on: 26-03-2012, 16:03:27 »
I always believed Sunzi to be the man that the generic stories told us: that he is the commander of the army under Regent King Helü of Wu.

Regarding Sunzi and its application in China after him:
I read many accounts regarding defeats of Chinese forces to a lot of foreign invaders that doesn't even know Sunzi. For example the Mongols, the Manchus, and the Wests (probably they already knew Sunzi by the time they invade Chinese ports). Most point out internal problem like ruling family affairs and corruption as the main culprit.

The World war 2:
But here comes the World War 2. During that time, China was run traditionally like Confucius suggested, with many ancient warlords ruling their own land, and weak central government run by bureaucrats full of nepotism practices (after all, Confucius suggested that the throne should be handed to the heir, not to the most competent). They praised ancient traditions like never before, and I guess the army generals all know Sunzi very well. But they fail miserably against the Japanese onslaught. WTF?

One thing that I learn from that particular defeat (against Japanese, in modern time), is how China and its society are sticking too much to the past. Like Han Fei Zi's critics about this mindset: "they think what works in the past, means it is proven." That's an anti-innovation mindset, thus Attorney General Li Si of Qin Dynasty, ordered to burn all Confucian reading materials and banned it from the public.

Maintaining cultural heritage and traditions is one thing, but letting them interfere with the reality is a big mistake. For example, my grandma is a very strict follower of traditional Confucianism. She maintains her own beliefs on everything she sees, even though none of Chinese philosophers ever seen that thing (like TV, Airplanes, Refrigerator, spacecraft, communication satellites, etc). Like in ancient China, the elderly is always right and sought after. So when things go wrong, she'll easily went on rage blaming how "technology doesn't work."

If you spend a lot of times with a lot of Chinese gramps, you'll know then, that all of these people have this common attitude like: "No one can teach China how to do things." These are very stone-headed people with tons of pride with them. After all, many worshiped Chinese Gods in both Taoism and Confucianism traditions are figured after people like these: old, ancient, and wise-cracking. E.g. the god of wealth and happiness is a deified figure of Tang Dynasty's General Guo Ziyi, a Nestorian Christian who restored the Tang Dynasty rule over China.

I can imagine Republic of China's Air Force generals and officers at that time. Being told by many people (probably including their parents) and "wise old people," about how they should stop toying around with metal kites and join the army instead. Consequences of this ongoing stupid tradition is, China got raped in the air, their armies bombed without impunity, and city defenses pummeled from the air. Followed by 100 years of heartache.

So it is not Sunzi not being right or being totally forgotten by the Chinese at that time. But it is more of the culture of the people. The Art of War principles still stand true to this day, it is highly relevant and important to know if you are in a war. Sunzi might not mention "air superiority" or "strategic bombing" in his compilations, but they are surely covered in "creating winning conditions" chapter.

But do the people change?

Still, up to this day, I heard a lot of wise-cracking advices from the elders like, "You like aeroplanes? Quit playing and grew up already!" Somehow, reinforcing the stereotypical Asian Dad meme. The reality, you can look at how the Chinese run its airline business: big, expensive, ugly, and losing money. The private ones are doing much better, e.g. Hainan Airlines.

The best that I got from these old guys is that, some of them make an attempt to modernize themselves. But still, in a way that it is weird and uncommon in many way. They blend the modern reality and tries to make sense of it using ancient teachings and wisdom using their limited knowledge, resulting in a what we call "Chinese strangeology."

My siblings and I joked, that for the old Chinese families, the only right education for your kids are "business school," "engineering school," "law school," and "medical school." The rest are mistaken by choice. That's one of it.

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #9 on: 26-03-2012, 16:03:22 »
*deleted as requested*

Lets stick on topic.


Well DLF, erm, this is a "test" to his theory, and trying to find out some faults, exceptions and stuff.
« Last Edit: 26-03-2012, 17:03:19 by General_Henry »

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #10 on: 26-03-2012, 16:03:25 »
Ok that was a bit of a flood reaction, I meant attributing too specific things during WW2 to Sun Tzu's paragraphs isn't that helpful. It's a nice exercise, but I wouldn't try to accommodate too many things just to show the wisdom in every line of his work. :)

I didn't want to kick off a discussion about the Chinese culture, of which I have to little knowledge at the moment to even comment on.
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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #11 on: 26-03-2012, 17:03:28 »
Yeah, but speaking of China in WW2, one will simply ask,

"where is your god of war now?"

While the fact that most of the Chinese force still stays intact despite losing a lot of important cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, etc. People still viewed that China is simply "defeated," because throughout the war, they seemed to never have the ability to overturn the momentum of the war like the Soviet Russians did.

The Soviets overcome the odds using their superior industrial capacity.

His art of war applies to most other situations, but let's say, if you are one of Chiang Kai Shek's officers, what will you do? I guess you'll do what Sunzi did: retire early and live in peace because nobody listens.

Well, I suggest you finish the whole chapter as soon as you can.

The thing about Sunzi's Art of War discussion that I am itching to discuss deeper is actually the last part. Chapter 13: The Use of Spies. It rarely gets attention from most discussions in books that I read, while I view it to be the most relevant to the modern world.

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Re: World War II and the Art of War
« Reply #12 on: 26-03-2012, 18:03:10 »
Yeah, but speaking of China in WW2, one will simply ask,

"where is your god of war now?"

While the fact that most of the Chinese force still stays intact despite losing a lot of important cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, etc. People still viewed that China is simply "defeated," because throughout the war, they seemed to never have the ability to overturn the momentum of the war like the Soviet Russians did.

The Soviets overcome the odds using their superior industrial capacity.

His art of war applies to most other situations, but let's say, if you are one of Chiang Kai Shek's officers, what will you do? I guess you'll do what Sunzi did: retire early and live in peace because nobody listens.

Well, I suggest you finish the whole chapter as soon as you can.

The thing about Sunzi's Art of War discussion that I am itching to discuss deeper is actually the last part. Chapter 13: The Use of Spies. It rarely gets attention from most discussions in books that I read, while I view it to be the most relevant to the modern world.

I am obviously not able to tell you how people operate their spy system because I don't read much about them (WWII spies), but I find chapter 12 and chapter 13 the less theoretical and more practical chapters of the Art of War. It is more like "I told you the theories now I give you a couple of practical tips and methods."

In my very own interpretation, spies are just a means to obtain intelligence upper-hand. The methods of infiltration might become different, though their nature remained the same: to not be deceived and to deceive your enemies. It is like a photo reconnaissance run in WWII can work both ways - you might actually photoed some decoys, or actually gained intelligence of enemy presence. In this situation, the recon plane is the spy, just you don't need to bribe it with money (but maybe by other means, like less fighter cover/AA guns) for it to work for you against the enemy.

Chapter 12 is somehow more interesting to discuss. Obviously in modern times fire attack is no longer as useful because of technological advance. But I do find stuffs that are in analog to fire attacks - weapons of mass destruction, like gas and nukes, especially that of a gas attack. However, all weapons like that are banished, thanks god.
« Last Edit: 26-03-2012, 18:03:41 by General_Henry »